Does Intent Depend on Effect?

2008 December 25
by Matt Deaton

Ok, so I was looking for “philosophy video blog” sites for ideas on incorporating video on SocratesVotes, and I came across this “experimental philosophy” vid.

Here’s the gist of it. Two almost idential scenarios are presented, then you’re asked two questions.

  • Scenario A: A company president is told that a new policy will maximize profits, but harm the environment. He acknowledges the harm to the environment, but insists that he only cares about profits. He gives the program the green light, and the environment is consequently harmed.
  • Scenario B: The same president is presented with the same profit-maximizing policy, only now it benefit the environment. As before, he acknowledges that it will help the environment, but insists that he doesn’t care—he’s only interested in profits. The program is implemented, and the environment is consequently benefitted.

Questions: In the first scenario, did the manager intentionally harm the environment? In the second scenario, did he intentionally benefit the environment?

Apparently a majority of respondents said yes to the first question but no to the second. I’m not sure why. It seems to me that in both cases the manager knowingly brings about some effect on the environment (good or bad), but in neither case does he intentionally bring about that effect. Now, just because the effects were unintentional doesn’t mean he doesn’t bear some responsibility—he’s still worthy of praise or blame, depending on the effect. But it seems pretty clear that environmental effects didn’t factor into his decision—he’s all about the Benjamins. (I’m assuming that the doctrine of double effect makes sense.)

Any ideas on how can we explain the people who thought intent depended on effect? Any of you have that reaction? And if that judgment is widespread, what are the implications for public opinion?

—Matt Deaton—

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2 Comments leave one →
2009 January 5
Ed Gonzalez permalink

I believe the lack of symmetry in answers stems from a less-than-complete definition of intent.

I think those than answered ‘yes’ to A and ‘no’ to B do so because they feel the president is responsible for the harm caused in A, but not for the good caused in B. I can rationalize this because we are taught two, seemingly contradictory, set of values:

1) We’re responsible for our actions
2) It is the thought that counts

If we use 1) to judge scenario A, the president is responsible for his harm. If we use 2) to judge scenario B, no praise is given.

Those respondents, I expect, were jumping to judgment or praise and deciding the president’s worthiness of either.

All that said, how do we get people to separate effect from intent? I think the answer may be in getting people to realize that what they believe as ‘intent’ may not be ‘intent’. Instead compare it to goal, or desire. If we substitute goal, I think it’s clear that the main goal in A or B had nothing to do with the environment.

My reaction was symmetrical, but opposite of yours, Matt. I felt that the intent was to harm and help the environment. While it isn’t the main intent, I feel that once one is aware of the consequences of future actions, taking said actions implies you intend the consequences. If the president didn’t know of the outcome of his actions on the environment, then I would agree he had no intent on either. Maybe this, too, stems from a bad definition of intent that I hold.

I think this judgment is widespread because of the values I noted before. If we substituted, ‘kill a human’ for ‘harm the environment’ and ‘save a life’ for ‘benefit the environment’ who among us would not consider the president guilty of murder in A? Guilt for murder, I believe, requires intent. While the person whose life is saved in B may thank the president, I expect most people are too jaded to assign praise for his actions, because he decided to move forward without regard to that individual’s life.

What does the judgment being widespread mean? I don’t know, other than people can easily hold contradictory points of view.

2009 January 6
Matt permalink

Hey Ed! Good to see you on here. And a very thoughtful response! Quite the philosopher, you are.

SUPERB analysis. Ok, so it looks like we’re making polar opposite judgments because our concepts of “intent” differ. But that doesn’t mean either of our definitions are bad. You think that someone intends to bring about a consequence if a) they recognize ahead of time a certain action will bring it about, and b) voluntarily take that action.

I, on the other hand, think someone intends to bring about a consequence only if they a) recognize ahead of time a certain action will bring it about, b) voluntarily take that action, and c) consciously desire that the consequence come about.

So on my account, the president doesn’t intend to cause environmental benefit or harm because not only does he not consciously desire any effect on the environment, in both cases he consciously acknowledges the environment is of no concern. But on your account, he does intend the environmental effects because he recognizes up front it will occur if he pursues the new policy, and that’s enough.

There’s really no problem with holding differing conceptions of a concept, especially if the definitions are laid out for all to see to ensure we’re all on the same page. I thought I might argue that my conception better captures paradigm cases of intentional action and excludes paradigm cases of unintentional action, but after writing a paragraph and a half, maybe it doesn’t! (That’s how it goes sometimes—you don’t really know what you think until you get it typed out. Often your gut was wrong! But you know this…)

So I’d say our redeeming virtue is that at least we’re consistent. We think the guy either intends or doesn’t intend based on explicit criteria. That doesn’t explain the idiots (sorry!) in the initial study who thought an action was intentional if it brought about bad, but not if intentional if it brought about good.

I think you’re onto something pointing out that we think we’re responsible for our actions AND it’s the thought that counts, and maybe that’s all I can say in favor of my conception. And I think your appeal to legal standards helps clarify things even more. Reckless driving can get a person a manslaughter conviction, but it takes a conscious desire + stepping on the gas and pointing your car at your ex-husband to get a murder conviction.

There must be some underlying definitional assumption swaying the judgment of the inconsistent respondents. Calling all idiots–why do you think this way? What is wrong with your brain? I’m kidding, of course! I just hope it’s not as simple as “make bad=intentional; make good no= intentional”. Surely it’s not. Surely. But then again, at least they’d be consistent :)

—Matt—

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