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	<title>Comments on: Does Intent Depend on Effect?</title>
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	<link>http://socratesvotes.com/2008/12/25/does-intent-depend-on-inten/</link>
	<description>Political Philosophy and Applied Ethics for Regular Folks</description>
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		<title>By: Matt</title>
		<link>http://socratesvotes.com/2008/12/25/does-intent-depend-on-inten/comment-page-1/#comment-169</link>
		<dc:creator>Matt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2009 03:38:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://socratesvotes.com/?p=498#comment-169</guid>
		<description>Hey Ed! Good to see you on here. And a very thoughtful response! Quite the philosopher, you are. 

SUPERB analysis. Ok, so it looks like we&#039;re making polar opposite judgments because our concepts of &quot;intent&quot; differ. But that doesn&#039;t mean either of our definitions are bad. You think that someone intends to bring about a consequence if a) they recognize ahead of time a certain action will bring it about, and b) voluntarily take that action. 

I, on the other hand, think someone intends to bring about a consequence only if they a) recognize ahead of time a certain action will bring it about, b) voluntarily take that action, and c)&lt;em&gt; consciously desire that the consequence come about. &lt;/em&gt;

So on my account, the president doesn&#039;t intend to cause environmental benefit or harm because not only does he not consciously desire any effect on the environment, in both cases he consciously acknowledges the environment is of no concern. But on your account, he does intend the environmental effects because he recognizes up front it will occur if he pursues the new policy, and that&#039;s enough.

There&#039;s really no problem with holding differing conceptions of a concept, especially if the definitions are laid out for all to see to ensure we&#039;re all on the same page. I &lt;em&gt;thought&lt;/em&gt; I might argue that my conception better captures paradigm cases of intentional action and excludes paradigm cases of unintentional action, but after writing a paragraph and a half, maybe it doesn&#039;t! (That&#039;s how it goes sometimes—you don&#039;t really know what you think until you get it typed out. Often your gut was wrong! But you know this...)

So I&#039;d say our redeeming virtue is that at least we&#039;re consistent. We think the guy either intends or doesn&#039;t intend based on explicit criteria. That doesn&#039;t explain the idiots (sorry!) in the initial study who thought an action was intentional if it brought about bad, but not if intentional if it brought about good. 

I think you&#039;re onto something pointing out that we think we&#039;re responsible for our actions AND it&#039;s the thought that counts, and maybe that&#039;s all I can say in favor of my conception. And I think your appeal to legal standards helps clarify things even more. Reckless driving can get a person a manslaughter conviction, but it takes a conscious desire + stepping on the gas and pointing your car at your ex-husband to get a &lt;em&gt;murder&lt;/em&gt; conviction. 

There must be some underlying definitional assumption swaying the judgment of the inconsistent respondents. &lt;em&gt;Calling all idiots--why do you think this way? What is wrong with your brain?&lt;/em&gt; I&#039;m kidding, of course! I just hope it&#039;s not as simple as &quot;make bad=intentional; make good no= intentional&quot;. Surely it&#039;s not. Surely. But then again, at least they&#039;d be consistent :)

—Matt—</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey Ed! Good to see you on here. And a very thoughtful response! Quite the philosopher, you are. </p>
<p>SUPERB analysis. Ok, so it looks like we&#8217;re making polar opposite judgments because our concepts of &#8220;intent&#8221; differ. But that doesn&#8217;t mean either of our definitions are bad. You think that someone intends to bring about a consequence if a) they recognize ahead of time a certain action will bring it about, and b) voluntarily take that action. </p>
<p>I, on the other hand, think someone intends to bring about a consequence only if they a) recognize ahead of time a certain action will bring it about, b) voluntarily take that action, and c)<em> consciously desire that the consequence come about. </em></p>
<p>So on my account, the president doesn&#8217;t intend to cause environmental benefit or harm because not only does he not consciously desire any effect on the environment, in both cases he consciously acknowledges the environment is of no concern. But on your account, he does intend the environmental effects because he recognizes up front it will occur if he pursues the new policy, and that&#8217;s enough.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s really no problem with holding differing conceptions of a concept, especially if the definitions are laid out for all to see to ensure we&#8217;re all on the same page. I <em>thought</em> I might argue that my conception better captures paradigm cases of intentional action and excludes paradigm cases of unintentional action, but after writing a paragraph and a half, maybe it doesn&#8217;t! (That&#8217;s how it goes sometimes—you don&#8217;t really know what you think until you get it typed out. Often your gut was wrong! But you know this&#8230;)</p>
<p>So I&#8217;d say our redeeming virtue is that at least we&#8217;re consistent. We think the guy either intends or doesn&#8217;t intend based on explicit criteria. That doesn&#8217;t explain the idiots (sorry!) in the initial study who thought an action was intentional if it brought about bad, but not if intentional if it brought about good. </p>
<p>I think you&#8217;re onto something pointing out that we think we&#8217;re responsible for our actions AND it&#8217;s the thought that counts, and maybe that&#8217;s all I can say in favor of my conception. And I think your appeal to legal standards helps clarify things even more. Reckless driving can get a person a manslaughter conviction, but it takes a conscious desire + stepping on the gas and pointing your car at your ex-husband to get a <em>murder</em> conviction. </p>
<p>There must be some underlying definitional assumption swaying the judgment of the inconsistent respondents. <em>Calling all idiots&#8211;why do you think this way? What is wrong with your brain?</em> I&#8217;m kidding, of course! I just hope it&#8217;s not as simple as &#8220;make bad=intentional; make good no= intentional&#8221;. Surely it&#8217;s not. Surely. But then again, at least they&#8217;d be consistent <img src='http://socratesvotes.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>—Matt—</p>
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		<title>By: Ed Gonzalez</title>
		<link>http://socratesvotes.com/2008/12/25/does-intent-depend-on-inten/comment-page-1/#comment-166</link>
		<dc:creator>Ed Gonzalez</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2009 14:18:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://socratesvotes.com/?p=498#comment-166</guid>
		<description>I believe the lack of symmetry in answers stems from a less-than-complete definition of intent.

I think those than answered &#039;yes&#039; to A and &#039;no&#039; to B do so because they feel the president is responsible for the harm caused in A, but not for the good caused in B.  I can rationalize this because we are taught two, seemingly contradictory, set of values:

1) We&#039;re responsible for our actions
2) It is the thought that counts

If we use 1) to judge scenario A, the president is responsible for his harm.  If we use 2) to judge scenario B, no praise is given.

Those respondents, I expect, were  jumping to judgment or praise and deciding the president&#039;s worthiness of either.

All that said, how do we get people to separate effect from intent?  I think the answer may be in getting people to realize that what they believe as &#039;intent&#039; may not be &#039;intent&#039;.  Instead compare it to goal, or desire.  If we substitute goal, I think it&#039;s clear that the main goal in A or B had nothing to do with the environment.

My reaction was symmetrical, but opposite of yours, Matt.  I felt that the intent was to harm and help the environment.  While it isn&#039;t the main intent, I feel that once one is aware of the consequences of future actions, taking said actions implies you intend the consequences.  If the president didn&#039;t know of the outcome of his actions on the environment, then I would agree he had no intent on either.   Maybe this, too, stems from a bad definition of intent that I hold.

I think this judgment is widespread because of the values I noted before.  If we substituted, &#039;kill a human&#039; for &#039;harm the environment&#039; and &#039;save a life&#039; for &#039;benefit the environment&#039; who among us would not consider the president guilty of murder in A?  Guilt for murder, I believe, requires intent.  While the person whose life is saved in B may thank the president, I expect most people are too jaded to assign praise for his actions, because he decided to move forward without regard to that individual&#039;s life.

What does the judgment being widespread mean?  I don&#039;t know, other than people can easily hold contradictory points of view.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I believe the lack of symmetry in answers stems from a less-than-complete definition of intent.</p>
<p>I think those than answered &#8216;yes&#8217; to A and &#8216;no&#8217; to B do so because they feel the president is responsible for the harm caused in A, but not for the good caused in B.  I can rationalize this because we are taught two, seemingly contradictory, set of values:</p>
<p>1) We&#8217;re responsible for our actions<br />
2) It is the thought that counts</p>
<p>If we use 1) to judge scenario A, the president is responsible for his harm.  If we use 2) to judge scenario B, no praise is given.</p>
<p>Those respondents, I expect, were  jumping to judgment or praise and deciding the president&#8217;s worthiness of either.</p>
<p>All that said, how do we get people to separate effect from intent?  I think the answer may be in getting people to realize that what they believe as &#8216;intent&#8217; may not be &#8216;intent&#8217;.  Instead compare it to goal, or desire.  If we substitute goal, I think it&#8217;s clear that the main goal in A or B had nothing to do with the environment.</p>
<p>My reaction was symmetrical, but opposite of yours, Matt.  I felt that the intent was to harm and help the environment.  While it isn&#8217;t the main intent, I feel that once one is aware of the consequences of future actions, taking said actions implies you intend the consequences.  If the president didn&#8217;t know of the outcome of his actions on the environment, then I would agree he had no intent on either.   Maybe this, too, stems from a bad definition of intent that I hold.</p>
<p>I think this judgment is widespread because of the values I noted before.  If we substituted, &#8216;kill a human&#8217; for &#8216;harm the environment&#8217; and &#8216;save a life&#8217; for &#8216;benefit the environment&#8217; who among us would not consider the president guilty of murder in A?  Guilt for murder, I believe, requires intent.  While the person whose life is saved in B may thank the president, I expect most people are too jaded to assign praise for his actions, because he decided to move forward without regard to that individual&#8217;s life.</p>
<p>What does the judgment being widespread mean?  I don&#8217;t know, other than people can easily hold contradictory points of view.</p>
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