Should Animals Have Rights?

2010 March 8
by Matt Deaton

Switzerland JUST voted on a referendum to grant “domestic creatures” the right to sue in court. The vote is SO fresh (happened yesterday), even the Great Google doesn’t know the result! It’s too late to influence my Swiss readers, but what should the rest of us think?

Is cuteness a morally relevant feature?

Is cuteness a morally relevant feature?

“Treat like cases alike” is a meta-ethical principle penetrating virtually every moral tradition. It also undergirds legal systems, ensuring predictability and fairness. If Speeder A gets a $100 ticket for driving 70 in a 35, Speeder B, also doing 70 in a 35, deserves a $100 ticket too. Unless, that is, there’s a moral difference–like Speeder A was drag racing, but Speeder B was rushing to the hospital to give birth.

With that principle in mind, whether animals should have rights, and what sorts of rights, largely depends on whether they’re relevantly similar to humans.

Peter Singer famously argued that non-human animals are relevantly similar to humans in that they can experience pleasure and pain. Orgasms are equally enjoyable, and broken bones equally painful, whether they’re experienced by humans or hippos. Singer concluded that it’s therefore “speciesist” to arbitrarily rank creatures based on their biological category, just like it’s “racist” to arbitrarily rank humans based on their race. Neither DNA nor ethnicity is all that important when it comes to assigning moral worth. It’s the ability to feel pleasure and pain that really counts. And on that metric, humans and non-human animals are equal, and so should be treated equally. Since we wouldn’t harvest and kill humans simply to enjoy the taste of their flesh, we shouldn’t harvest and kill non-human animals simply to enjoy the taste of their flesh either.

Tom Regan settled on a similar conclusion, but used different premises to get there. He argued that whether a creature is a “subject of a life” was the important question to ask. That is, a thing has moral standing if it has emotions, thinks, makes decisions, has a sense of personal identity, and has some sense of time. Since all normal adult mammals are subjects of a life, they should be granted legal protections on par with those humans enjoy. The result would be a complete prohibition on hunting, factory farming and animal testing.

Both Singer and Regan make strong cases. But notice that neither prioritized the capacity to engage in higher reason–precisely what distinguishes humans from non-human animals. Giraffes make decisions–that’s clear enough. But as far as we can tell, they don’t ponder the nature of the universe. The question is, is being able to ponder the nature of the universe morally relevant?

Being able to engage in higher reason is morally relevant in that it allows a creature to be part of what Allen Fox calls a “moral community.” Pondering the nature of the universe isn’t a big deal, but being able to make ethical decisions–distinguish right from wrong, be motivated to do what’s right, and then act according to what’s right–is. It’s important because it enables a sort of reciprocity and mutual respect. Dogs and humans are similar in all the ways Singer and Regan mention. But this one key aspect sets us apart. Dogs can be good natured and obey their masters, but they can’t think through tough ethical quandaries or be motivated to act simply for the sake of acting rightly.

However, that doesn’t mean non-human animals lack any moral standing at all. It’s pretty clear that Singer and Regan’s arguments give us reason to take seriously the interests of non-human animals. Being able to feel pleasure and pain, having a sense of identity, experiencing emotions and the like do carry moral weight. But that key difference gives us good reason to place humans on a higher plane.

So, should animals have rights? Of course! Rights to natural habitat? Rights to bodily integrity? Rights to sue in court? I’ll leave that to the Swiss voters to decide! But I think it’s pretty clear that non-human animals do in fact deserve a strong degree of legal protection due to all the morally relevant similarities they share with humans. It’s appropriate to distinguish ourselves as full members of the moral community, but we should never be so arrogant as to treat thinking, feeling and loving animals as mere things.

16 Comments leave one →
2010 March 10
Mel permalink

I suppose when an animal becomes vocal enough that we can distinguish it’s specific and exact needs and reason well (I’m really saying speak English in my case) then I probably should worry about whether or not I can boss it around, make it sit, and stay, or eat it.

Until then, I don’t think there’s any dilemma in not allowing them to be a part of the justice system.

:)

2010 March 11
Kevin permalink

How does a “right to sue in court” actually work? It seems to work out straightforwardly for minimally competent adults. Fill out the paperwork yourself or hire a lawyer and you are in the system. Do children have a right to sue in court? My no-law-experience intuition is that children have to sue through a proxy–parents, legal guardians, court-appointed whateveryoucallems, etc. So how does a domestic creature go about using the court system?

I also wonder if there will be a boom in animal psychics in those parts.

2010 March 11

Mel, Ok, so you’re arguing that the morally relevant feature is language–specifically, the ability to communicate with humans, since that capacity is necessary to communicate one’s needs, desires, dislikes, etc. And I’m taking it that you don’t think there’s anything intrinsically valuable about language, but it’s just a practical matter–if they can’t talk, they can’t sue, right?

Kevin (thanks for joining the conversation, by the way), I think I can answer your question and reply to Mel’s argument simultaneously.

The Swiss apparently passed a law a couple years ago that laid out pretty specific guidelines as to how non-human animals should be treated. Cages must be at least x square feet, animals must be medically treated for conditions x, y and z–that sort of stuff. The recent referendum (for which I STILL can’t find a result) concerns the state’s burden to represent mistreated animals in court.

If it passed, local attorney general offices would be obligated to represent non-human animals in court whose owners violated the regulations. Perhaps they could sue for damages to be awarded a new owner who could then give the mistreated animal proper (according to the law) care? I’m not sure, but I’m assuming that’s how it would work. (Otherwise, what’s the point of suing the owner if the damages are paid the owner?)

So Mel, I’d say that if it were up the the animals to do the suing, you’d have an excellent point. :) However, in this case, it would work like Kevin suggests it works in the US for children, via proxies.

And last, the Swiss may be a little eccentric, but hopefully psychic revelations will not be admissible in court :D

2010 March 12

You’ve left out the major argument against rationality as a criterion, and I have to think that you did that on purpose. You can’t talk about rationality as the distinction between humans and animals without handling borderline cases. Do you want to talk about them, or do you want me to do that?

2010 March 13

Wear it out, Mike! I actually went into higher apes in a draft, but decided it was getting too far off topic–turning into a human rights post. But feel free to take us in that direction!

2010 March 13

Well, I don’t think that it’s the sort of thing that you can avoid if you’re going to lean on rationality as your rights-boundary. I’m not going to wear it out here, but I’ll give it a brief treatment.

Rationality seems like a natural and reasonable (heh) place to draw the rights-line. It must be realized, however, that some humans aren’t capable of the level of rationality that even apes and other animals can use. The “borderline cases” problem forces us to recognize that some humans are going to fall below this line and that some animals are going to be above it. If they’re below the line then they will have moral consideration, but they won’t have rights.

Some folks find this troublesome. If a mentally disabled human doesn’t have rights then we would not be morally prohibited from treating them in the same ways that we treat other things that can’t reason. This is going to lead some folks to dismiss rationality as the right place to draw the line. After all, it seems wrong to treat the profoundly retarded and the really really senile in the same way that we would treat dogs or cattle.

The other response is to bite that bullet and just admit that some humans don’t get to participate in human rights because they don’t meet the criterion. This isn’t a popular thing to say, but it’s the logical destination of the rationality argument.

2010 March 14

Well put, Mike. One more solution is to admit that rationality is the proper criterion on which we should base rights, and admit that some humans fall below the requisite threshold, but then go ahead and grant all humans rights anyway because the transaction costs in trying to figure out who’s rational enough and who’s not would outweigh absorbing borderline cases. Sounds kinda like cheating, but hey–have that cake, eat that cake, smear that cake on your belly if you can!

Of course, if you buy it, that much solves the human side, but if we’re consistent we might have to also grant all higher apes rights too. I’m fine with that. Many seem rational enough, and even seem to engage in fairly high level moral behavior–conforming to norms, displaying guilt, and punishing transgressors.

But actually, a recent conversation with a student (you da man, Kyle Motts!) has me reconsidering whether dogs can behave morally. What degree of abstract reflection should we require before considering a creature a moral agent? Dogs self-sacrifice, conform to norms even when lacking immediate threat of reprisal, and possess virtue (gentleness, bravery, loyalty). You could say they’re conditioned to behave as they do, but so too are many nonreflective humans, who just abide by whatever ethical system they inherit. Humans have a deeper capacity to revise their moral judgments, but given how few actually exercise that capacity, I dunno.

I’m suspending judgment for the moment. There’s something special about Peter Singer’s moral reflection, but what about Joe Sixpack’s? Or mine a decade ago? Are our moral capacities significantly superior in kind? In degree? And if we don’t exercise them, why are they still morally relevant?

2010 March 14

Sure, we might act as though humans who are incapable of rational thought have rights. We wouldn’t farm them because there are those who are sentimental and whose feelings would be hurt if they found out that we were farming nonrational humans. That’s a transaction cost, I suppose, but it’s not one that comes from figuring out which humans are below the line. That probably wouldn’t be that hard. The hard part is convincing some people that there are humans who aren’t worthy of having rights.

With regard to dogs and Joe Sixpack, I think you’re slipping between capacity and the use of capacities. Joe and the dog might both be acting on instincts, but Joe has the capacity for rational action, and the dog (probably) does not. (I’ve recently been interested in what it takes to make a rational decision, and I think it has to be more than having a reason, but I don’t know exactly what it takes.)

(Might be off topic.)
I’m not sure that dogs really have moral virtues at all. They might be gentle and loyal and such, but it’s certainly not obvious that these characteristics are the result of some kind of consideration. Do we say that dogs have vices? I mean, one might be vicious, but we don’t usually blame the dog for being that way. We blame the owner and we call the Dog Whisperer to fix the dog. I’m sure that there are people whose viciousness we’re tempted to excuse (like JoJo the Dictator), but in most cases we say that a person is responsible for their vices that they have. I bet that this reaction is due to the assumption that a person should know better than to embrace vice, but that a dog just can’t know better.

2010 April 13
Maria Rosales permalink

Matt,
As I vegetarian and a strong believer for animal rights, I’ve always considered an animals intellectuality and rationality the most important reason for giving them moral value. The way I see it, if a group of genius aliens ever happened to come to earth and wanted to eat humans on the basis that they’re a lot more smarter than us, we’d find it object to it and the same goes to animals. We can’t mistreat them because they may seem less rational than us because we wouldn’t want to be put in that position. Pigs are as smart as 3 year old infants but we don’t go around eating babies. You could say that the baby has more moral worth because it has the capacity to become a rational human being but it also has the capacity to create harm or become more of a burden than an animal ever would.

I think the Swiss have it right by giving animals rights even if they can’t fight for themselves, someone else now has that chance to represent them.
As for pain, I don’t think I would eat meat even if there was a way to kill animals without causing them pain. At this point, I would feel to convicted about ending its life.
Thank you for addressing this issue, but I feel that it was necessary for you to address the issue of rationality and it would also help to know which philosopher you would agree the most with, Peter Singer or Tom Regan?
Cheers,
Maria

2010 April 27
Rick James permalink

I just typed my term paper, but I can’t leave this one alone. Here we go. To answer one issue of weather or not I would kill another animal to eat it. I will lower myself to the animal’s level and reduce myself to a primitive cave-man. I’m a carnivore, so yes I would kill it to eat it. On their level, in the law of nature, there are no animal police to trial me for murder. Add the moral aspect of my survival, I was hungry so I ate. Animal rights are protected enough. We protect wild animals and their habitats. We protect domestic animals under the animal cruelty laws. Isn’t that enough? People like to bring up meat farms as being cruel, they fail to recognize that those animals would not exist other wise. They were breed to be eaten. So, should they be protected and given the same rights as wild animals or domestic animals? No, they shouldn’t because they wouldn’t exist if it were not for their purpose of being food for us. If the Swiss are going to give animals the right to sue in court, they might as well give them the right to bare arms and run for elections. I want to see a monkey run their banking system. Aren’t they really just recognizing the rights of the owner of the animal to sue in court anyways?

2010 April 27
Rick James permalink

I missed the conversation about rationality. I just want to point out my theories of a rational decision vs. a moral decision. 1st up o’rational. a rational decision is made by considering what pertains directly to the being making the decision. I am hungry, I will eat. Any living thing will make that sort of rational decision. OW! Fire burns, I will run away from it. You get the point. A moral decision takes complex and abstract thought. Taking in all that the consequence, good or bad, will effect. Think of the recent murder trials of the people that killed that young Knoxville couple a few years ago. Now consider giving them the death penalty. I bet a lot of people said, “kill those monsters!” Now is that so immoral? Those murders are people who have the God given right to life, but consider if we were to allow them to go through the correctional system and maybe get released, would they hurt someone else? Chances are, if they are incapable of making moral decisions, they would. Now consider, was it a morally correct decision to make if you said not to give them the death penalty? Not if they end up killing again. We, as a society, treat these “sub-human” beings like animals all the time. Maybe not with the death penalty as often as just taking away their freedom. If humans thought like crocodiles, we would probably farm them without a second thought. The only reason we don’t is because we consider cannibalism to be discusting.
Now try and think of an animal that is capable of making a decision that does not just concern the well being of itself. A dog might seem like it will protect it’s owner out of love, but more likely out of self concern. If something happens to my master who will feed me? Sadly, neither theory of this nature can be proven. We don’t know what animals are thinking, but my theory seems more logical.
Rational decision: I have some trash around my house that attracts dangerous verman and flies. I must get rid of it by throwing it over the hill side.
Moral decision: If I throw this trash over the hill side, it will contaminate the water supply and sicken the people up stream who depend on it for survival. I cannot throw it over the hill side, so I will burn it.

2010 April 28
Matteson permalink

Rick,

Why do you think that our breeding an animal for food (a cow perhaps) matters in a moral sense? You say that they wouldn’t exist at all if we didn’t “make” them for that purpose. That’s certainly true for each cow, but does that mean that we shouldn’t give them any moral consideration at all? Can we just torture them for fun? Probably the answer to that is “no.”

Domestic animals probably would exist if we didn’t think they were cute (or whatever), but you think they should have some sort of protection. Why are they different?

2010 April 30
Rick James permalink

I am speaking of the animals that humans breed specifically for consumption. Cattle were my main idea. When you look into a pasture of live stock, you are looking at animals that would not exist had the farmer not breed them for the purpose of being eaten. I could even take it a step farther and talk about the selective and mixed breeding of the species for optimal meat output, but that point could be spread beyond cattle. Think of how dog breeders started to mix species for the purposes of function, guarding, herding, etc. Now think of how breeders mix species for aesthetic reasons alone. Just to win a dog show. These animals, more than likely, would not exist in nature had man not interrupted.
Now, as for the question of why shouldn’t they be treated any different from people. I should think that most farm animals live a good life. I really don’t see anything wrong with letting an animal live it’s life in comfort and not suffering throughout old age. I am not saying that leaves room for torture to be morally permissible. Torture, of anything for any reason, is just morally irrational. It is just something a morally rational being would not or could not do. Human beings who lack out “gift” of moral rationality are sub-human, they suffer from what I like to call the “human defect.” They could be the missing link to our primitive ancestors.

2010 April 30
Matteson permalink

Thanks for the response, Rick. I might not have been clear. What I meant to ask was why cows and dogs who have both been bred by us for specific qualities should be treated differently.

You say above: “People like to bring up meat farms as being cruel, they fail to recognize that those animals would not exist other wise. They were breed to be eaten. So, should they be protected and given the same rights as wild animals or domestic animals? No, they shouldn’t because they wouldn’t exist if it were not for their purpose of being food for us.”

Why should animals that share the same quality (being made by us) not be treated in the same way?

2010 April 30
Rick James permalink

Well, in another sense, they are treated they same way, but should not be given the same rights as humans (this goes the same for any other animal). They live out their purpose for us just as all domesticated animals do. What I was getting at, is the idea that farming any certain animal for consumption is not morally wrong. Animals should be considered for their value to us (the domesticated) and their ecosystems (the wild). The more valuable the animal, the more respect or protection it should be given. This does not mean giving animals the same rights as humans, but respecting their right to live. Here in AMERICA, we do just that. We allow domesticated animals to live out their purposes with respect to their values, and we allow ,and protect, wild animals to “do their thing.” I understand that people who do mistreat any animal, be it wild or domesticated, are usually punished accordingly (again here in AMERICA).

Thank you, Matteson, for pointing out my inconsistency and giving me a chance to clarify.

So to reiterate, I do not believe it to be in the best interest of our society to give any animal the same rights as humans. I do believe animals should be treated with respect to their right to live out their lives in order to fulfill their purposes to us or nature. To sum it up, treat animals well and basically the same, but not the same as people.

Thank you again, Matteson, for pointing this out to me. I do not like to sound as “flip-flopish” as a politician during an election.

2010 June 10

Maria and Rick — thanks for posting! Maria, I think Singer and Regan both have good arguments, but both go too far with their conclusions. Regan wants full rights for almost all animals, but there significant differences in our capacities that I think should translate into a gradation of rights. I very much appreciate Singer’s contribution to the animal liberation movement (that’s the title of his classic book, in fact), and his arguments are decent, but since I’m not a utilitarian, I can’t go all the way with his conclusions either. Nonhuman animals deserve serious consideration, but not equal consideration.

Rick, excellent questions, thoughts, replies and revisions. It looks like you and Matteson sorted everything out? Cool to see you on here–come back any time! (You too, Maria!). And be sure to check out Matteson’s blog too, available via the “Recommended” link at the top.

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